Micro-credit programs and land distribution: a note by Nabin, Munirul & Bose, Gautam
          Deakin Research Online 
 
This is the published version:  
 
Nabin, Munirul and Bose, Gautam 2006, Micro-credit programs and land distribution: a note, 
Economics bulletin, vol. 15, no. 9, pp. 1-7. 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30003545 
 
Reproduced with the kind permissions of the copyright owner. 
 
Copyright : 2006, Economics Bulletin 
Micro-credit Programs and Land Distribution: A Note 
Munirul Haque Nabin Gautam Bose
Deakin Business School, Deakin University, Australia School of Economics, University of New South Wales,
Australia
Abstract
"Micro-credit" has come to refer to a popular extension strategy---usually in the agricultural
sector---whereby a government or NGO extends credit at favorable rates to poorer borrowers,
with repayment being supported by some kind of mortgage on the borrower's social capital.
In the commonest case, eligibility is determined by the borrower's wealth, as indexed by
his/her landholding. This note shows that, with an imperfect land market, the response to
such a program will be to fragment landholdings which are smaller than a certain threshold,
while larger holdings remain unaffected. Thus the pattern of landholding will tend to become
more polarized.
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I. Introduction. “Micro-credit” has come to refer to a popular extension
strategy—usually in the agricultural sector—whereby a government or NGO
extends credit at favorable rates to poorer borrowers, with repayment being
supported by some kind of mortgage on the borrower’s social capital. In
the commonest case, eligibility is determined by the borrower’s wealth, as
indexed by his/her landholding. The Grameen Bank, for example, has for a
long time used the benchmark that agents who own half acre of land or less
are eligible for its loans, which are available at interest rates lower than the
market.
Intuitively, the existence of such a program provides incentives for the
fragmentation of land, leading to a larger number of small holdings. How-
ever, in most less-developed agrarian economies the land market is imperfect,
implying that a seller cannot recover the full present value of his land by sell-
ing it. This in turn provides a disincentive to fragmentation.
This note shows that, with an imperfect land market, the response to
such a program will be to fragment landholdings which are smaller than a
certain threshold, while larger holdings remain unaffected. Thus the pattern
of landholding will tend to become more polarized.
II.Historical Evidence Land fragmentation is a common feature in poor
agrarian countries with high population densities, such as India and Bangladesh.
The inheritance customs prevalent in these traditional societies are often in-
voked as the cause of fragmentation. However, these customs alone are not
sufficient to explain the full extent of fragmentation. For example, Qadir
(1960) in his study of Dhanishwar in Bangladesh argues that fragmentation
occurs at greater pace than can be explained by inheritance customs alone.
Heston and Kumar (1983) are also of the opinion that inheritance customs
are not a sufficient explanation. There is, however, no doubt that fragmen-
tation has occured at a great pace in recent times—some data is presented
in Muhith (1999, see the table on page 187). One can possibly argue that, in
the presence of increasing overpopulation, commercial or financial incentives
can trigger increased land fragmentation.
Below we present a simple model which analyses the impact of current
micro-credit practices on land fragmentation, and indicate that greater po-
larisation of landholding occurs as a result.
III. Model. There is one farmer/borrower who has x acres of land, and
two potential lenders.
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Borrower: The farmer initially has no assets other than land. He needs
one unit of working capital per unit of land. He uses working capital and
land to produce an output y per unit of land.
Lenders: The two lenders are, respectively, an NGO (subscripted 1) and
a commercial bank (CB, subscripted 2). Each lender has in place sufficient
enforcement mechanisms to ensure that borrower repays a loan. However,
the two use different mechanisms, and their enforcement costs vary.
The NGO exploits mortgages on social capital—such as peer monitoring
schemes—and can therefore lend at a relatively low rate r1.
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The CB, on the other hand, does not have access to the farmer’s social
capital. It operates enforcement schemes that are more costly than that used
by the NGO. Thus the CB must charge a higher interest r2 which is greater
than r1. However, borrowing is profitable at this rate, i.e.,
y > (1 + r2) (1)
We assume the NGO is operating a targeted micro-credit scheme, and its
loans are only available to small landholders. In other words:
Assumption 1. The farmer can only access loans from the NGO if his
landholding is no greater than a, which is the threshold used by the NGO to
distinguish ‘poor’ borrowers.
Since we are interested in the question of whether the farmer will fragment
his land in order to access loans from the NGO, we assume that his initial
landholding is too large for this, i.e.,
x > a. (2)
Land market: The land market is imperfect, in the sense that the price
which a plot of land fetches on the market is less than the discounted value
of the future stream of returns produced by the land.
The future stream of returns of course depends upon the rate of interest
the farmer can access. Letting δ denote the farmer’s discount factor, the
valuation is q = 1
1−δ [y− (1+ r)], where r takes the value r1 if the farmer can
access loans from the NGO, and r = r2 otherwise. We accordingly define
q1 =
1
1− δ [y − (1 + r1)]
1The NGO can lend at low rate also because it has access to foreign funds with lower
interest rate.
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q2 =
1
1− δ [y − (1 + r2)]
Specifically, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2. : The imperfection in the land market takes the following
form: if p is the price per unit of land on the market, then p = αq2 where 0 <
α ≤ 1.
The closer α is to unity, the smaller is the market imperfection. Such
imperfections arise most readily from asymmetric information, where the
buyer cannot ascertain the true quality of the land, and must therefore be
accorded a discount. In poor agrarian economies, in addition, land may
also be less liquid owing to a lack of buyers with ready cash. Further, the
value of a plot to its current owner may be higher as a result of convenience
in location—proximity to other plots which the owner also cultivates, or to
other holdings where the owner may work part of his time for a wage.
Timing: First, the farmer decides whether to fragment his land or not. If
he fragments, then he sells x− a units of land at a price p. Next, he obtains
a loan from either the NGO or the CB, as appropriate. Then production
takes place, output becomes available, and loans are repaid.
Objective function: The farmer’s aim is to maximize the sum of his re-
tained harvest, the value of his landholding, and his liquid assets at the end
of the period, where land is valued at q1 or q2 as appropriate.
IV. Analysis. The farmer’s optimisation problem can be simplified in the
following manner. Note that the farmer makes only one decision, whether
to fragment his land or not. If he does not, then he has x units of land
and access to loans at the rate r2, and the discounted present value of his
property is:
V2 = q2x
If instead he decides to fragment, then he has a units of land and access
to loans at the rate r1, so the present value of his land is q1a. He also has
the proceeds from the sale of (x− a) units of land at p per unit, for a total
discounted wealth of
V1 = q1a+ p(x− a)
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He will fragment his land if V1 > V2, i.e., if:
q1a+ p(x− a) > q2x (3)
⇒ (q1 − p)a > (q2 − p)x
⇒ x < (q1 − p)
(q2 − p)a
Define
x∗ =
(q1 − p)
(q2 − p)a
it follows that farmers who own land in amounts smaller than x∗ will frag-
ment their land, retaining holdings of size a and selling the remainder, while
farmers who have holdings larger than x∗ will retain their original holdings.
If this process continues for long enough, we will find that the size distri-
bution of landholdings is polarised in the following sense: landholdings are
either of size a and smaller, or of size x∗ and larger.
The degree of imperfection in the land market is critical in determining
the pattern of polarisation. If the land market is missing altogether, so that
p = 0, then we get
x∗ =
q1
q2
a =
y − (1 + r1)
y − (1 + r2)a
which cannot be too large if the two rates of interest are reasonably close
together. In this case only holdings which exceed a by a small margin will
be fragmented.
On the other hand, if the land market is perfect so that p equals the full
value q2 of land, then x
∗ becomes infinitely large, and all holdings larger than
a will ultimately be fragmented. The final distribution will then consist of a
large number of small holdings.
Highly unequal distributions of holdings will be generated for intermedi-
ate degrees of imperfection in the land market, i.e., for values of p between
0 and q2. Appropriate values of p, for example, may generate distributions
where holdings are either 10, 20, or 50 acres or larger, on the one hand, or
of half-acre sizes, on the other.
In most poor agrarian economies, it is difficult to directly measure income
inequality. Inequality in asset-ownership is often used as a proxy measure.
Land, in turn features prominently in these calculations as the most easily
measured asset. This analysis leads to the conclusion that micro-credit—or
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other poverty alleviation programmes which use asset-ownership as a mea-
sure of poverty—may have the consequence of increasing measured income
inequality. If agricultural production is susceptible to scale effects, these
programmes may also have consequences for productivity.
V. Further Research. The following table reveals some on going process
of the distribution of land size holding in Bangladesh from year 1977 to
1983-84.
Please see the table 1 in Appendix.2
It is apparent from the table 1 that during 1977-1983/84, the land frag-
mentation to half-acre has dramatically increased from 2.8% to 17.5% (which
is 6.25 times higher). This feature is also present in the groups of landholding
size 0.5-0.99 and 1.00-2.49 acres. However, for the group which has landhold-
ing size above 2.49 acres, the percentage of land holding decreases. It may
be the case that large size of land is subdivided into small pieces of land
due to several reasons such as inheritance custom, land reform policy. More
interestingly, the percentage of landholding for the group which possesses
landholding size 0.5 or less has increased vastly compare to other groups. It
indicates that the tendency of land fragmentation to 1/2 acre land -is higher
than all other groups. Incidently, Grameen Bank and other NGOs start their
operation (with 1/2 acre land threshold) from 1976. One can certainly make
a conjecture that the differentiated credit policy of those organizations have
accelerated land fragmentation. However, this is only one possibility and how
common this kind of land fragmentation –is essentially an empirical question.
Recent studies have shown that the number of dropouts of micro-credit pro-
gramme has increased and those dropouts neither rose out of poverty nor
economically graduated leaving the ultimate objective of poverty alleviation
in question (Karim and Osada, 1998). The situation will be worse if those
dropouts fragment their lands and left the programme before rising out of
poverty. Therefore, the issue of land fragmentation is very important and
further research should be carried out in this regard.
2This table is taken from Muhith (1999, page 187).
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Appendix
Table 1: Landholding Size Distribution
Holding size (acre) Year % of holding no. % of total land area
<0.5 1977 2.8 0.5
1983-84 17.5 2.74
0.5-.99 1977 5.5 2.15
1983-84 11.8 5.08
1.00-2.49 1977 17 16.1
1983-84 28.9 21.16
2.50-7.49 1977 21.6 48.9
1983-84 17.9 45.09
7.5-14.99 1977 3.9 21.16
1983-84 2.9 17.76
>15 1977 1 11.19
1983-84 .06 8.17
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